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The criminal provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)'
and the judicial interpretation thereof aord the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) great discretion, in determining both when and against whom criminal
prosecution is warranted. Though it may employ a wide variety of enforcement
mechanisms, the FDA has relied in recent years ever more heavily on criminal
proceedings.2 Absent appropriate guidelines, however, extensive use of criminal
sanctions to enforce the FDCA potentially leads to costly, inecient, and un-
necessary prosecutions. This paper attempts to dene such guidelines in the
context of criminal liability for corporate ocers and employees.3 First, the
paper will describe corporate liability under the FDCA. Next, it will utilize eco-
nomic tools to propose guidelines to help determine when this liability is best
imposed. Finally, it will examine the factual settings of two seminal cases in
food and drug law using the proposed guidelines.
The FDCA allows for the imposition of criminal sanctions against a corpo-
ration itself and against ocers and employees of that corporation. Section 303
of the Act states that [amy person who violates the Act is subject to criminal
nes, imprisonment, or both.4 The Act denes person elsewhere as an indi-
vidual, partnership, corporation, and association.5 However, the statute left
unclear the question of whether the relevant person can at the same time be
both a corporation and
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the individual ocers or employees who act on behalf of the corporation.
The Supreme Court, in two decisions separated by thirty years, claried
the statutory ambiguity. In United States v. Dotterweich,6 the Court held that
under the FDCA a corporation may commit an oense and all persons who aid
and abet its commission are equally guilty.7 Such persons include all who do
have such a responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the
statute outlaws.8 FDCA criminal liability, moreover, is a form of strict criminal
liability; the government need not oer any proof of the criminal intent of those
who stand in such a responsible relation.9 Left undened by the Dotterweich
court was the precise meaning of responsible relation.
Seeking to clarify the meaning of responsible relation, the Court in United States v. Park'0
held that the government establishes a prima facie case of criminal liability when
it presents facts that a defendant's position in the corporation would have al-
lowed that defendant to prevent the criminal violation in the rst instance or
correct the criminal violation once discovered. The Park Court also sought to
limit the scope of criminal liability by excusing corporate ocers when prevent-
ing or correcting the criminal violation would be objectively impossible.'2
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As interpreted by the Supreme Court, then, criminal liability under the
FDCA is potentially boundless. The government may prosecute not only the
corporation itself, but also any ocer or employee who exercises some measure
of authority over the relevant corporate activities. Seemingly, the only limit
to the sweep of FDCA criminal liability is the discretion aorded the FDA, by
legislative enactment'3 and by judicial opinion,'4 to initiate { or refuse to initiate
{criminal proceedings .
With respect to the decision to initiate criminal proceedings against corpo-
rate ocers or employees, current FDA policy is informal at best, irrational at
worst. No codied
regulations govern the decision. And, unlike the decision to
16
either
initiate criminal proceedings against a corporation, n
do internal policy guidelines. Instead, the FDA focuses its analysis on whom
to prosecute, not whether prosecution is warranted in the rst place. The
FDA policy is simply to include at least one corporate ocer or employee as a
defendant.'7 The rationale is that criminal sanctioning is ineective as a deter-
rent unless it falls on the individuals who constitute the corporation, and not
just the legal entity that is the corporation. The only issue left for determi-
nation, then, is which corporate ocer or employee the FDA wishes to charge.
Generally speaking, the FDA, with a glance at the Park decision,
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chooses only those ocers or employees in a position to prevent the violation
or correct the violation once it became known. And, the FDA will only seek
prosecution if, after being advised of the violation, the corporate ocers or
employees fail to correct it.'9
The FDA reviews the decision to prosecute an individual at a number of
bureaucratic levels within the agency - - both at the regional oces and at the
headquarters. At each level, FDA ocials give the decision careful consideration
to ensure it conforms with FDA policy.20 Prior to nal disposition within the
agency, the FDA noties the corporate ocer or employee of its impending
decision and aords him the opportunity for a hearing before the FDA. The
notice and hearing procedures, codied in regulation, 21 are termed Section 305
hearings, after the statutory provision requiring them.22 The hearing process is
largely informal23 and the corporate ocer or employee need not appear, though
it is an important opportunity to convince the FDA that criminal prosecution is
unwarranted.24 Recent practice has been to institute Section 305 hearings only
when the FDA has already decided that prosecution is likely to be appropriate;
the hearings are not to be considered warnings.25
FDA policy always to include at least one corporate ocer or employee as a
defendant demands critical analysis. Blind adherence to the policy is unjustied
and largely inecient.
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Discretion to initiate criminal proceedings must be exercised with caution.
Criminal proceedings and criminal punishment, like the criminal violations they
are designed to prevent, are socially costly.26 It makes little sense to incur these
signicant costs unless signicant benets result. Necessary, then, is an ana-
lytical framework to guide the FDA into initiating criminal proceedings only
when they generate net social benets. Applying economic tools to FDA deci-
sionmaking in this area { a practical, logically sound, and convenient approach
{ would ensure net social benets.
An economic analysis can serve to guide the FDA in reaching its most impor-
tant decisions concerning criminal liability for corporate ocers or employees.
First, economic analysis will help FDA set optimal levels for criminal sanctions.
Next, economic analysis will help FDA determine whether it should initiate pro-
ceedings against the corporate ocers or employees. Finally, economic analysis
will establish when nes constitute suitable sanctions and when imprisonment
is necessary.
In economic terms, an optimal level for criminal sanctions is one that achieves
the greatest benet at the least cost. To begin the analysis, assume for simplicity
that the benet to be derived from criminal sanctioning is the prevention of
FDCA violations. This is a fair assumption given that the explicit purpose of
imposing criminal sanctions against FDCA violators is
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to prevent the violations in the rst instance.27 Next, assume that a potential
violator of the FDCA exhibits economically rational behavior. In other words,
the violator will act only when the expected benets for him of violating the
FDCA exceed the expected costs. 28 This, too, is a fair assumption given that
the potential violators of the FDCA generally are corporations or corporate
ocers or employees whose primary motive is prot maximization.
Given these two assumptions, it is clear that an optimal level of criminal
sanction from the standpoint of the FDA is one that would make it too costly
for the potential violator to
29 other so that
act. In words, the sanction must be set the
expected costs for the potential violator of violating the FDCA exceed the
potential benets. In such circumstances, the economically rational potential
violator will choose not to violate the FDCA, as he expects that he will be better
o not violating the FDCA than violating it.
The optimal level of criminal sanction will depend upon the ex ante proba-
bility of the FDA's catching and successfully prosecuting the potential violator.
By denition, the expected costs for the potential violator can be calculated
by multiplying the probability of facing the sanction by the sanction itself. To
use a numerical example, assume that the sanction for violating the FDCA is
$1,000. Assume further that the FDA
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catches and successfully prosecutes violators only 10% of the time. In such a
case, the potential violator can expect that he will face a $100 ne if he chooses
to act, since he knows that the $1,000 sanction will be imposed only one in ten
times. There are an innite number of combinations of sanction and probability
whereby the potential violator faces the same expected $100 ne. For instance,
if the sanction were set at $2,000, the probability need only be set at 5% for
the expected ne to be $100. Similarly, if the sanction were set at $500, the
probability need be set at 20% for the expected ne to be
$100.
Given the innite number of combinations of sanction and probability avail-
able, the FDA, were it to act rationally, would choose to set the sanction rel-
atively high and the probability relatively low. Assume for the moment that
imposing a sanction is a costless process.30 Recall, however, that catching and
prosecuting a violator involve great costs. A rational actor would seek to mini-
mize these costs without sacricing the benets of enforcement.3' To do so, the
actor, in this case the FDA, would determine the minimum expected cost neces-
sary to deter a potential violator, and then set the sanction high enough so that
it need not expend signicant resources catching and prosecuting violators.32 To
see this numerically, assume that the benets a potential violator will receive
from violating the
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FDCA are $99. The FDA would need to set the sanction and the probability
so that the potential violator would face a $100 ne should he choose to act.
The FDA could, for example, choose among the following combinations of sanc-
tion and probability, respectively: $100, 100%; $1,000, 10%; $10,000, 1%. The
potential violator would be indierent to these choices; in all cases, he expects
to pay a $100 ne. For the FDA, however, the third choice is best; it spends
the least amount of money yet achieves the same result.33
The diculties presented by such an inquiry are obvious; they suggest an
important shortcoming in the analysis. In order to determine the optimal level
of sanction and probability, the government would need, rst, information as to
the benets a potential violator would expect from an FDCA violation. Such
information is theoretically available, but prohibitively costly. The cheapest
means of acquiring such information would be from the potential violator him-
self. But, this approach defeats the purpose of the sanction because it identies
violators ex post and fails to prevent violations ex ante. Even assuming the
FDA could gather the information, it would need to determine how dierent
levels of expenditures of enforcement resources would aect the probability of
catching and successfully prosecuting potential violators. The determination
would be inexact at best.
The described diculties are damaging to the analysis, but
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not fatal. One possible means of addressing them is to set a very high sanction
and prosecute a widely known oender. Such a course is advisable because it
maximizes expected sanctions without imposing signicant costs on the FDA. A
highly public prosecution may skew the perception of other potential violators
as to the probability of their later being caught and successfully prosecuted.
Coupled with the extremely high sanction, the misperceived probability leads
to a high expected cost. This should deter most potential violators. Such
a course, however, is fraught with risk. First, too high a sanction may be
socially unacceptable as not commensurate with the violation. Next, choosing
the defendant based on public relations value is problematic from a fairness
standpoint. Finally, the other potential violators may not be fooled by the
gambit.
As can be derived from the foregoing analysis, the diculties notwithstand-
ing, the appropriate defendant in a criminal case will be the person or persons
who both can choose the violation and will benet from the violation. Imposing
a criminal sanction on a defendant who cannot choose the violation would be
wasteful.35 Such a defendant would, by denition, act whether or not he expects
the cost of the sanction to be imposed on him. As for the defendant who does
not benet from the violation, there is no incentive for him to act in the rst
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instance; he stands to gain nothing from the violation, but will expect a
cost. Again, the imposition of a criminal sanction on such a defendant would
be wasteful, as there is no need to prevent him from committing a violation.
In a typical case of an FDCA violation, the corporation itself and any num-
ber of corporate ocers or employees both can choose36 the violation and will
benet37 from the violation. 38 According to the model described above, then,
both the corporation and the relevant ocers or employees should face the cost
of criminal sanctions. However, because of the existence of disciplining mech-
anisms within corporations, it may not be optimal to impose criminal liability
on corporate ocers or employees. Instead, the FDA may choose to allow the
corporations to punish the ocers or employees in their own ways.
The FDA should forego criminal prosecution of corporate ocers or employ-
ees when the disciplining mechanism within a corporation imposes an optimal
sanction39 on an ocer or employee more cheaply than the FDA can impose its
own, presumably optimal, sanction. 40 In fact, the FDA is already encouraging
closer monitoring and more stringent sanctioning within corporations. In so
doing, the FDA will be able to minimize enforcement costs without sacricing
result. Generally speaking, it is relatively cheap for a corporation to initiate
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disciplinary proceedings against an ocer or employee because the corpora-
tion is not burdened with the requirements of due process.42 However, economies
of scale produce savings when the government investigates and imposes sanc-
tions against both the corporation and its ocers or employees in one proceed-
ing; a second proceeding initiated by the corporation could be duplicative and
therefore wasteful.43 It might be that the savings achieved outweigh the cost of
due process, arguing for government, as opposed to corporate, sanctioning.
That the result will be the same from the perspective of the corporate ocer
or employee, whether he faces sanctions from the FDA or the corporation, is
clear. Like the FDA, the corporation, because it faces sanctions for FDCA vio-
lations, wishes to prevent its ocers or employees from committing violations.
To do so, it will set its own internal sanctions so that the expected costs for its
ocers or employees of violating the FDCA will exceed the expected benets.
As a rational actor, the corporation will reach the same conclusions about opti-
mal sanctioning, described above, the FDA would reach.45 In either case, then,
the corporate ocer contemplating an FDCA violation will face expected costs
exceeding expected benets.
As with the analysis of sanctioning, the analysis of the appropriate defendant
has shortcomings. The most obvious is the
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information cost involved in assessing a corporation's internal disciplining mech-
anism. The rst cost associated with the analysis is determining whether the
corporation has an eective mechanism at all. Perhaps the only source of such
information is the very defendant, the ocer or employee, the FDA is consid-
ering prosecuting. And, these ocers and employees have a sharp incentive to
exaggerate the usefulness of the disciplining mechanism in order to avoid crim-
inal liability. The next cost is determining how eciently such a mechanism
operates. Again, there seems to be no unbiased source of such information. As
above, however, the diculties described are not fatal to the analysis. A possible
solution is for the FDA to consider the past history of the corporation and its
responses to criminal proceedings brought against it. Such information might
surface during Section 305 hearings. Presumably, the corporation, to appease
its shareholders or improve public relations, would have instituted disciplining
mechanisms following previous criminal proceedings. If it did not, or if there
were no previous criminal proceedings, the FDA should simply initiate an action
against the relevant ocer or employee on the assumption that only the FDA
is in a position to impose an optimal sanction.
Seeking to minimize enforcement costs extends to the FDA decision of whether
to impose monetary or nonmonetary sanctions
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on a violator. From the FDA perspective, these sanctions are equally eective.
In other words, it is possible to place a monetary value on a nonmonetary
sanction so that a potential violator would be indierent as to which sanction
the FDA imposed. For example, assume that one hour in jail is worth $100
to a potential violator. From the perspective of the potential violator, then, it
makes no dierence whether the sanction for the violation is ve days in jail or
$12,000.46 For him, the sanction is the same. Therefore, the deterrent eect
is the same. From the perspective of the FDA, however, the two sanctions
present a stark choice. On the one hand, monetary sanctions, relatively cheap
to impose, provide revenue for the government; on the other, nonmonetary
sanctions, relatively expensive to impose, drain revenue from the government.48
Therefore, to minimize enforcement costs without sacricing result, the FDA
should choose to impose nes as a rst option, and resort to prison only when
necessary.
Two interrelated factual issues determine whether prison is an appropriate
sanction for a corporate ocer or employee:
the wealth of the ocer or employee and the likelihood that a violation will
be dicult to detect. The wealth of the ocer or employee sets the maximum
monetary sanction the FDA could impose on that ocer or employee. Any
sanction beyond the maximum will simply never be paid. In such circumstances,
the
13Title: Criminal Liability Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
Author: 104-2081-40-57
Date: January 26, 1995 (12:42pm)
Page 14
ocer or employee will not face the optimal expected costs because he faces
sanctions equal to his wealth, not the optimally chosen sanction. For example,
assume that the optimal expected cost to deter an expected benet of $99 is
$100, where the probability of being caught is 10% and the sanction is $1,000.
Assume also that the ocer's or employee's wealth is $900. The ocer or
employee will face an expected cost of only $90 { a 10% chance of losing his
$900 in wealth. Therefore, the ocer or employee will choose to commit the
violation here, as the expected benet exceeds the expected cost. To make up
for the $100 dierence in sanctions, the FDA may simply impose the equivalent
of $100 worth of prison. Then, the ocer will face the optimally chosen sanction.
When a violation is dicult to detect, it is likely that the optimal sanction
will be extremely high, increasing the prospect of its exceeding the ocer's or
employee's wealth and leading to a prison sanction. By denition, the probabil-
ity that the FDA will catch and successfully prosecute a potential violator when
the violation is dicult to detect is small. As noted above, when the probability
of prosecution is small, the sanction must be high so that the potential violator
faces optimal expected costs.5' An extremely high sanction will doubtlessly ex-
ceed the ocer's or employee's wealth, leading the FDA to seek a prison term.52
Therefore, when the violation
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is easily concealed, the FDA should seek nonmonetary sanctions. This part of
the analysis suers, too, from potential
drawbacks. Again, information costs are the most obvious of those draw-
backs. A frequent, and fair, criticism of the approach raises the concern that it
is dicult to assign monetary values to nonmonetary sanctions, especially when
potential violators value nonmonetary sanctions dierently. Nonetheless, it is
both theoretically possible and currently employed. Consider, for instance, a
criminal statute the violation of which carries a 30-day prison term or a $5,000
ne. The drafters of the statute presumably believed that a 30-day prison term
is roughly equivalent to $5,000.
To pause for a summary, then, the above analysis recommends the following
guidelines for FDA discretion. First, the FDA should set sanctions so that the
expected costs for a potential FDCA violator exceed his expected benets. Next,
the FDA should seek criminal sanctions against a corporate ocer or employee
when he could choose and would benet from the violation, and when internal
corporate disciplining procedures are either nonexistent, non-functioning, or
relatively inecient. Finally, the FDA should seek prison terms only when a
defendant cannot fully pay the assessed ne. To see how the suggested guidelines
might work, it will be helpful to apply them to specic facts. The Dotterweich
and Park cases serve as
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convenient factual settings here.
The Dotterweich case is particularly interesting. Dotterweich was president
and general manager of Bualo Pharmacal Company, a small business that
purchased drugs from wholesalers and resold them to physicians.53 Learning
of Bualo Pharmacal's misbranding of a number of shipments of drugs, the
government sought to impose criminal sanctions on both the corporation and
Dotterweich.54 Somewhat surprisingly, at trial the jury acquitted the corpora-
tion but convicted Dotterweich.
Because of the diculties in determining optimal levels of sanction and prob-
ability, as explained above, the rst factor I will examine is whether Dotterweich
had the opportunity to choose the violation. While he may have had no per-
sonal knowledge of the misbranding, Dotterweich was in a position to establish
procedures to ensure that the misbranding would not occur. Only twenty six
employees, all located on one oor of a building, worked for Bualo Pharmacal.56
Presumably, Dotterweich could exercise signicant day-to-day and transaction-
by-transaction supervisory control over all twenty six employees. Were he con-
cerned about the possibility of misbranding, he could have exercised that control
more carefully. In a sense, then, Dotterweich chose the violation by not exercis-
ing this control.
The next factor to consider is whether Dotterweich
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benetted from the violations. The facts of the case suggest only that the
misbranding was inadvertent. It is not clear, then, that any benet accrued to
Dotterweich, or, for that matter, to the corporation. However, one could rightly
argue that the corporation saved a signicant amount of money by choosing not
to institute appropriate supervisory control. In that sense, then, the corporation
benetted from the violation. Further, Dotterweich could be seen to have ben-
etted, though indirectly. His choice to avoid the supervisory controls and save
the corporation money could have brought him salary increases, job security, or
the like.
The next question to consider is whether Bualo Pharmacal had in place
internal monitoring procedures such that Dotterweich would face corporate dis-
ciplinary proceedings. Although the facts as reported do not supply the answer,
a few assumptions may be warranted. First, the small size of the corporation
and its seemingly informal nature suggest that no internal mechanisms were
in place. And, it is clear that Dotterweich exercised great control within the
company. Even if internal mechanisms existed, it is not likely that they would
be utilized to discipline Dotterweich.
Given that Dotterweich chose the violation, benetted from it, and likely
would not face sanctions from the corporation, the government was correct in
bringing charges against him. The
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decision to seek a monetary, as opposed to nonmonetary, sanction must now
be examined.
Assuming that the government set the level of the ne optimally, prison
would be inappropriate in this case. The nes totalled $j,5QQ57 Although
not a trivial sum in 1942, Dotterweich could probably aord it. Therefore,
resort to nonmonetary sanctioning would be unnecessary.
Moreover, concealing the misbranding of drugs is dicult. If the drugs
caused harm, the harm { illness or death { would likely be signicant. Govern-
ment authorities would normally learn of that harm { from the victims, their
families, or their doctors { and seek to determine its cause. If the drugs did
not cause harm, any random testing of the drugs would reveal the misbrand-
ing. As noted above, when a violation is dicult to conceal, there is no need
for extremely high sanctions because the likelihood of successfully catching and
prosecuting violators is high. Without extremely high sanctions, resort to non-
monetary sanctioning would be unnecessary.
The dierent factual setting of the Park case leads to a somewhat dierent
conclusion as to the advisability of initiating criminal proceedings against Park.
Park was president and chief executive ocer of Acme Markets, a large, national
retail food chain.58 After nding evidence of rodent infestation at a number of
Acme warehouses and alerting Park to
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the problem, the government sought to impose criminal sanctions against
the corporation and against Park.59 Acme pled guilty to the charges; a jury
found Park guilty and ned him a total of
$250 60
Unlike Dotterweich, Park knew about the rodent infestation problem. On a
number of occasions, the government informed Park by letter of the infestation.61
Park attempted to correct the problem, but failed. In failing, one could certainly
argue that Park chose to allow the violations to occur. He simply did not do
enough to end them.
Again, unlike Dotterweich, Park probably did not benet from the violations.
Instituting a more eective system to monitor warehouse sanitation than that
existing when the violations occurred would presumably be expensive. Failing to
do so likely saved Acme some money. However, it is not clear that such savings
would, in the context of such a large corporate endeavor, be signicant. If the
savings were, in fact, insignicant, then benet to Park in the form of salary
increases, job security, or the like would be small or nonexistent. Even if the
savings were signicant, prosecution of Park may still not be warranted. In the
sprawling enterprise that is Acme, benet to the corporation would not accrue
to the employees to the same degree as would benet in a smaller operation,
such as Bualo Pharmacal. The link between corporate
19Title: Criminal Liability Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
Author: 104-2081-40-57
Date: January 26, 1995 (12:42pm)
Page 20
performance and employee benet may be too attenuated. Also unlike Dotter-
weich, Park likely would face a well-
established corporate mechanism for ensuring internal discipline, operated
either by the outside board of directors or the inside management. Although the
facts of the case do not speak of any such mechanism, it is fair to assume that
a complex business operation like Acme has in place such a formal mechanism.
It would be hard to imagine Acme's being able to function without
it. However, more investigation would be necessary, especially as to the
relative cost of instituting internal disciplinary proceedings and the level of
sanctions Park might expect from the corporation.
Although Park chose the violation, he may not have benetted from it and,
regardless of the government's decision to act, may face sanction from Acme
itself. Therefore, it is far from clear that the government appropriately chose to
initiate criminal proceedings against Park. Assuming, however, that the decision
was appropriate, the next step is to examine whether monetary sanctions would
suce.
Assuming the government set the sanction optimally, nonmonetary sanctions
would be unnecessary. The nes totalled $250, hardly a severe burden for the
president of such a large corporation and unlikely to lead to his bankruptcy.
However, because the violations in this case are more easily
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concealed than those in Dotterweich, nonmonetary sanctioning may be ap-
propriate. Rodent infestation, unlike misbranding of drugs, does not raise the
specter of severe harm. Even if harmed in fact, the victims may not be aware
of the harm. Moreover, there is not necessarily an easy, foolproof means of in-
specting a warehouse for rodent infestation. An inspector may simply miss the
evidence of infestation. Because the violations may be relatively easy to conceal,
higher sanctions may be appropriate. In other words, the previous assumption
that $250 is a correct sanction may be misplaced. And, with higher sanctions
comes the higher probability of requiring the imposition of nonmonetary sanc-
tions 62
In conclusion, the guidelines suggested by the paper are far from perfect, but
important nonetheless. Certainly the guidelines would be dicult to implement
with any precision. However, the guidelines would provide the FDA enforcement
ocer with a roadmap to help him maneuver through the dicult decision as
to whether it is appropriate to initiate criminal proceedings against a corporate
ocer or employee. In other words, the guidelines are not intended to provide
the FDA with the right answers, but with the right questions.
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to prosecute both a business entity and an individual separately.
4. 21 U.S.C. x 333(a) (1) (1988)
5. Id. x 321(e)
6. 320 U.S. 277 (1943)
7. Id. at 284.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 284 - 85.
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10. 421 U.S. 658 (1975)
11. See id. at 673 - 74.
12. See id. at 673.
13. See 21 U.S.C. x 336 (Nothing in [the FDCA] shall be construed as
requiring the Secretary to report for prosecution, or for the institution of libel
or injunction proceedings, minor violations of this Act whenever he believes
that the public interest will be adequately served by a suitable written notice
or warning. )
14. See. e.c~.. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 835 (1985) (The (FDCA's]
enforcement provisions thus commit complete discretion to the Secretary to
decide how and when they should be exercised.).
15. Ultimately, the decision to proceed with a prosecution lies with the
Department of Justice (DoJ). This paper is solely concerned with the FDA
decision to recommend to the DoJ a course of action. It is not concerned with
decisionmaking at the DoJ.
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16. The decision to bring suit against a corporation is governed by a thoughtfully conceived
analysis of the costs and benets of initiating the action. ~ Yiu H. Hui, United States Food Laws,
Regulations, and Standards 482 - 87 (1979); Sam D. Fine, The Philoso~hv of Enforcement, 31 Food
Drug Cosm. L.J. 324, passim (1976); Eugene M. Pfeifer, Section 305 Hearings and Criminal Prosecutions,
31 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 376, ~assim (1976)
17. See Richard A. Merrill, The Park Case, 30 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 683, 685 (1975)
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See Hui, su~ra note 16, at 484 - 87.
21. See 21 C.F.R. xx 7.84 - 7.87 (1994).
22. See 21 U.S.C. x 335 (1988) (codifying x 305 of the original FDCA).
23. See 21 C.F.R. x 7.85(c) (1994).
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24. See id. x 7.84(f).
25. See Fine, su~ra note 16, at 326.
26. Little would be gained by highlighting statistics detailing the cost of the criminal justice
system in the United States. Suce it to say that preventing crime is a costly venture.
27. See 1 James T. O'Reilly, Food and Drug Administration x
8.01, at 8-3 (2nd ed. 1994).
28. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 223 (4th ed.
1992). Because the FDA seeks to aect a potential violator's
actions ex ante, the analysis turns on expected benets and
costs.
29. See id. at 224.
30. The costs associated with imposing a sanction will be discussed in the text briey
below.
31. See Posner, supra note 28, at 225.
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32. For simplicity, the discussion is assuming a risk neutral actor. The
analysis would be slightly dierent were the actor risk averse or risk loving. The
general idea, however, is the same.
33. Note that there probably is a limit to the level of sanction the
FDA could impose. It is likely that beyond a certain point, society would protest
that the penalty is not commensurate with the crime. Such a protest, though
it may be morally justied, is not necessarily economically rational.
34. The FDA, in fact, is taking this approach. See Benjamin &
Floman, su~ra note 2, at 641 - 45 (describing FDA enforcement
against widely known companies and products, such as Procter &
Gamble and Beech-Nut Nutrition)
35. By wasteful, I mean that the imposition of the sanction will
impose a social cost but will garner no social benet.
36. Naturally, that the corporation is choosing is a ction, but no
more a ction than its legal existence as a person.
37. Corporate ocers possibly benet from FDCA violations in at
least two ways. First, such violations may increase corporate
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prots, to which salaries may be tied. Second, increasing prots may lead
to promotions or increased job security.
38. Certainly, there may be instances where only the corporation or only
its ocers or employees both can choose the violation and will benet from
the violation. Because such cases seem rare, however, I will ignore them for
simplicity.
39. An optimal penalty is assumed here to be the same as that
described above. See supra text accompanying notes 27 - 33.
40. Because there does not exist a private right of action to enforce the
FDCA, see Peter B. Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law
1217 - 19 (2nd. ed. 1991) (discussing cases holding that the FDCA does not give
rise to a private right of action in federal court), and because there is likely no
private mechanism to discipline corporations, the FDA should always initiate
criminal proceedings against the corporation. Theoretically, trade associations
could discipline members for FDCA violations. However, antitrust law would
severely limit such sanctions, leaving the trade associations all but powerless in
this regard.
41. See 1 O'Reilly, su~ra note 27, x 8.02, at 8-9. The dissent in
Dotterweich suggested a similar course. Justice Murphy
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proposed that the corporation could bring suit against the relevant ocers
or employees for breaching their duties to the corporation. See United States
v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 286 (1943) (Murphy, J., dissenting) . However,
this is not the type of internal monitoring the text advocates. A suit initiated
by the corporation against its ocers or employees is likely to be only slightly
less costly than a criminal suit brought by the government against the same
ocers or employees. And, because of the diculty in bringing such suits from
the shareholders' perspective, they would be rare.
42. See John C. Coee, Jr., No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick:
An Unscandalized Inquiry Into the Problem of Corporate
Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386, 408 (1981)
43. See id., at 387 & n.6.
44. Presumably, the sanctions will be set so that the corporation
will never choose to violate the FDCA; in other words, the sanctions will be
optimal, as described above. See su~ra text accompanying notes 27 - 33. Should
the sanctions be nonoptimal, the corporation may be encouraged to violate the
FDCA. In that case, the argument in the text fails; the corporation would not
set any sanctions for its ocers or
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employees because a decision to violate the act will benet, not harm, the
corporation. In fact, the corporation may create incentives for its ocers or
employees to violate the FDCA.
45. Note, too, that the problem of determining the optimal combi-
nation of sanction and probability is mitigated when a corporation imposes the
penalty. The corporation is better positioned than the FDA to determine the
optimal combination because it is closer to the potential violator and is likely
already monitoring the potential violator in some fashion.
46. Each day is worth $2,400 (24 hours multiplied by $100 per
hour). So, ve days is worth $12,000 (5 days multiplied by
$2,400 per day)
47. Generally speaking, more stringent procedural protections at-
tach to government proceedings imposing prison terms than to those imposing
nes.
48. See Posner, strnra note 28, at 227. Consider especially the
costs of running a prison system.
49. Obviously, the FDA cannot jail a corporation.
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50. Note that the problem of wealth cannot be cured by imprisonment when the defendant
is the corporation. See Coee,
supra note 42, at 389 - 93.
51. See su~ra text accompanying notes 27 - 33.
52. See su~ra text accompanying notes 49 - 50.
53. See United States v. Bualo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d 500,
501 (1942)
54. See id.
55. See id. The defense attorney seemed to have convinced the jurors that convicting
the corporation would put all of its employees out of work. See Hui, su~ra note 16, at 488.
56. See United States v. Park, 499 F.2d 839, 841 n.3 (1974)
57. See Bualo Pharmacal, 131 F.2d at 501.
58. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 660 (1975)
59. See id.
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60. United States v. Park, 499 F.2d 839, 840 (1974)
61. See Park, 421 U.S. at 662, 664.
62. A likely reaction to the conclusion that nonmonetary sanctions
might be appropriate for Park but not for Dotterweich is one of confusion. It
may seem counterintuitive to seek prison sanctions for violations that may lead
to relatively minor harm, but not seek prison sanctions for violations that may
lead to relatively major harm. In fact, such a course is rational, given the
assumption that the purpose of the sanctions is not to punish for the sake of
punishment but to prevent violations in the rst place. It simply may be that
achieving that goal in the most ecient manner possible requires counterintu-
itive, but economically rational, measures.
31